



**Q
&
A**

**QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
ON THE
SOVIET THREAT
AND NATIONAL SECURITY**

**Disarmament Program
American Friends Service Committee
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
Questions and Answers on the Soviet Threat and National Security

	Page
1. We do have to provide for national security. A strong military makes us secure doesn't it?	3
2. Without a strong defense wouldn't we be vulnerable to attack and invasion as we were in the early days of World War II?	3
3. But if we don't maintain a strong nuclear deterrent, couldn't the Soviets put us in a position where, if we didn't capitulate to their demands, they'd strike first, wipe out our forces and take over?	4
4. Hasn't our nuclear deterrence policy worked? It's prevented nuclear war so far, hasn't it?	4
5. Aren't the Russians building up their military faster than the U.S.?	7
6. Don't they spend more on arms than the U.S.?	7
7. If we spend more, couldn't we win the arms race?	8
8. Of course we want disarmament, but what about the Russians?	8
9. The Soviet system is different. Even if the Soviet people want peace, the government isn't responsive to the Soviet people.	9
10. But the Soviets have been expanding ever since World War II. Look what happened in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and now in Afghanistan. Aren't they also in Africa and hadn't we better be prepared to stop this Soviet expansionism?	11
11. What about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Doesn't this prove the USSR is seeking to expand its territory?	13
12. Isn't the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a first step toward their eventual goal of gaining control of Middle East oil?	15
13. Doesn't the U.S. have a responsibility to defend freedom and support our allies around the world?	16
14. Everyone wants disarmament, but how would disarmament begin? What about the Soviet Union?	18
15. Even if the Soviets agree to arms limitation or reductions, how do we know they won't cheat? You can't trust the Russians!	19
16. How about the Helsinki Treaty? The Soviets violate human rights, so why should we trust them?	21

17. Even if the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. agree on initial steps towards disarmament, what about the other nuclear powers—China, for example, or the countries which already have or may soon have nuclear capability (Pakistan, Isreal, South Africa, for example)? 22
18. Unemployment is a terrible problem. Doesn't military spending provide jobs? 23
19. Isn't military spending good for the economy? World War II got us out of the Depression, didn't it? 24
20. Everything you say sounds very risky. How can we rely on such an untested system when our national security is at stake? 25
21. People have always fought. Isn't it unrealistic to expect us to get rid of war? Can we really change human nature? 26
22. Aren't we powerless - helpless - to do anything to change the situation? It's really in other hands. 26

1. *We do have to provide for national security. A strong military makes us secure, doesn't it?*

A. In the short run, arms may make people feel secure. The problem is that our reliance on nuclear armaments which appears to increase security actually is making us less and less secure. Each day, the United States adds 3 new nuclear warheads to its stockpile of over 9,200 strategic nuclear warheads,¹ enough to destroy every Soviet city of 100,000 or more 35 times.² Just one of the US's 31 Poseidon submarines carries more explosive power than was detonated in all of Europe and Japan in World War II.³



In an attempt to catch up with the US, which has led the nuclear arms race from the start, the Soviet Union is steadily increasing its military power and for the first time, is considered equal to the US in overall strategic nuclear capability.⁴ With its present stockpile of 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads,⁵ the USSR can destroy every American city of 100,000 or more 28 times.⁶ Furthermore, there are already other nations with nuclear weapons, and by 1985, there may be as many as 35 more.⁷

With each escalation of the nuclear arms race our security is actually diminished. Does anyone doubt that we and the Soviets are less secure now than we were in 1945 before nuclear weapons existed? We all experience, almost on a daily basis, a growth in our fears and in our sense that we no longer control our own national destiny or our ability to decide on whether there will be war or peace.

2. *Without a strong defense wouldn't we be vulnerable to attack and invasion as we were in the early days of World War II.*

A. The situation today is totally different than in World War II. There is no real defense against attack by nuclear weapons. It takes 30 minutes or less for a nuclear weapon to travel bet-

ween the United States and the Soviet Union. The smallest nuclear bomb in either arsenal is three times the size of the bomb that we dropped on Hiroshima.

Nuclear war is a wholly new kind of war. There would be no winners. In a major nuclear exchange, the US would lose over 165 million people and the Soviet Union almost as many.⁸ A so-called limited war could kill as many as 20 million in each nation.⁹ There can be no quantitative comparison of this kind of war with any in the past.

3.

But if we don't maintain a strong nuclear deterrent, couldn't the Soviets put us in a position where, if we didn't capitulate to their demands, they'd strike first, wipe out our forces and take over?

A.

The "capitulation scenario" has serious flaws. One is the misconception that the US does not already have a strong deterrent.

Just two submarines using their destructive power equal to 1,000 Hiroshima-sized weapons can destroy all the 200 major Soviet cities. In the 1960's Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, demonstrated that 400 nuclear missiles would be an adequate deterrent, since they would be able to destroy 30% of the population and 75% of the industrial capacity of the USSR.¹⁰ So it is virtually impossible that the Soviet Union could ever wipe out our forces without getting wiped out in return. The more important and more difficult question for Americans and Russians is whether our goal should be to threaten each other with mass destruction.

This is exactly the reason that a new alternative to "capitulation" vs. "first strike" must be developed. Instead of a new weapons system (which would surely provoke an equivalent system on the other side) we need to build a security system so that those two unacceptable choices are gradually replaced by a conflict resolution process which, as Robert Johansen writes, can "allow us to avoid war . . . without fear of being bullied or conquered in a world of sometimes selfish and brutal governments."¹¹

4.

Hasn't our nuclear deterrence policy worked? It's prevented nuclear war so far, hasn't it?

A.


It is true, there has not yet been a nuclear war, but this may have been more by luck than by design. The nuclear war that we all fear may have been avoided only because there have been no serious accidents, misunderstandings or miscalculations in the past 35 years. We did come dangerously close during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even more significantly, the


direction of the current global arms race increases the likelihood of nuclear war in at least four ways:

(1) the number of nations with nuclear weapons is increasing (this is called horizontal proliferation). Until recently there were only two nations with nuclear weapons capability. It is estimated that there will be 100 nuclear nations by the year 2000 unless something is done to reverse the trend.¹²

(2) a new generation of nuclear weapons deployed in an atmosphere of increased tension makes a first strike more thinkable. In the past, we and the Soviets shared a policy of deterrence called, "mutual assured destruction", that is, each side possessed nuclear arsenals which threatened such awesome retaliatory destruction of the population centers of the other that it was believed neither side would consider it "worthwhile" to begin a nuclear war. But now both sides are developing counterforce weapons, such as the MX and the Trident II missiles, which focus on military targets and not civilian targets. Such weapons theoretically can first strike and destroy an enemy's weapons before they can be used against us. So it means our weapons must be kept on a hairtrigger alert, in order to "launch on warning", and the danger of nuclear war is greatly increased. In an international crisis where tensions are running high, one nation or another would be that much more likely to "go first", if it believed that its own weapons might be destroyed.

(3) the capacity for miniaturization of nuclear weapons and for pinpoint accuracy leads to the contemplation of a "limited" nuclear war. As technology expands enabling the





US to build more accurate and smaller warheads, missile homing devices, better data processing, charged particle beam interceptor satellites, etc., the US military defense posture is moving away from the deterrence concept, to a pre-emptive "limited" nuclear war fighting strategy. On August 6, 1980, the Carter administration made this shift in strategy public in Presidential Directive #59. The Directive said that the US would be targeting military sites, not civilian, and that it could then engage in prolonged "limited" nuclear wars with the Soviets.¹³ The President then called for the building of the MX Missile, which is the ultimate in technological development combining the various improvements necessary for "limited" nuclear war fighting.

Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger said, "it is immoral to target cities," and "we have to make the underlying calculations about nuclear war intellectually acceptable."¹⁴ Such beliefs pave the way for certain confrontation and inevitable nuclear war, which have no guarantee of remaining limited.

(4) as technology becomes even more complex and sophisticated, the possibility of accidental war increases enormously. There have already been 50 accidents since 1945 involving American nuclear weapons.¹⁵ The US Air Force has admitted 15 accidents involving planes carrying nuclear bombs and, on one occasion, a B-52 bomber crashed in South Carolina with a 10 megaton bomb on board. The impact of the crash triggered four of the five interlocking safety devices guarding the warhead.¹⁶

The US has been on strategic nuclear alert 16 times since the nuclear arms race began.¹⁷ On several occasions the information provoking the alert was later discovered to be incorrect. Most recently, on June 3 and again on June 8 of 1980, a malfunctioning 46¢ computer circuit chip in a NORAD computer was the cause of a full alert signaling a Soviet missile attack.¹⁸ Fortunately, the error was caught within six minutes. As we and the Soviets move to a "launch on warning" or counterforce policy, the time for

response will be diminished and the likelihood of nuclear war is increased.

Because the risks of nuclear war - and the consequences of such a war - are so profound and unpredictable, it is time to begin considering a reversal of direction towards a security system not based on one nation's ability to destroy another nation.

5. *Aren't the Russians building up their military faster than the US?*

A. The Soviet Union's military capability has been increasing. Since 1964 when the Brezhnev era began, a serious Soviet armament program was undertaken as a response to the "humiliation" suffered during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It has proceeded steadily ever since, with the rate of buildup remaining the same over the years.¹⁹ The pattern has been for the US to make an advance in the arms race and for the USSR to match us approximately six years later. There is no question that this steady Soviet military growth (for example, their increasing number of MIRV's - Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles) threatens the invulnerability of our ICBM's - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles -in the same way that our MIRV'd missiles have been able to threaten their ICBM's since the early 70's.

According to the US Department of State, "in terms of overall nuclear power, the two nations are roughly equal".²⁰ This is called "essential equivalence" although the US still maintains significant technologic superiority in such important aspects of accuracy, lethality, readiness and warhead numbers.*²¹ The SALT II Treaty reflected this equality or parity in the two Superpower's nuclear capability and many experts believe now is the time to stop the arms race. Such parity may not come again.

6. *Don't they spend more on arms than the US?*

A. While the Soviet Union appears to be spending a higher percentage of it's GNP on armaments, this may be a serious distortion of comparative reality since the Soviet GNP is half as large as the US's.²² In addition, official US estimates of Soviet military spending (where we get the percentages to begin with) are based on CIA figures arrived at by computing

*The US leads in strategic warheads 3 to 2; in MIRV'd ICBMs 2 to 1; in MIRV'd submarines 4 to 1; and in heavy bombers 3 to 1. Soviet missiles are less accurate. They suffer from geographical disadvantages and no overseas bases of any consequence. Fifty percent of the US missile launching sub fleet can operate away from port at one time, only 11% of the Soviet fleet can.

Soviet costs in terms of US dollars.²³ Because the ruble is not convertible on the inflationary international market, those figures grossly overestimate the true cost. For example, the CIA computes the Soviet army pay not at the low Soviet ruble scale for their drafted army, but at our high volunteer army dollar rate, with all the fringe benefits.²⁴



7.

If we spend more, couldn't we win the arms race?

A.

The key question is whether our current military program makes it more or less likely that the Soviet Union will continue to increase its military strength. As former State Department official and consultant to the Pentagon, Richard Barnet says, "It would do well to remember that a generation of periodic tough talk and \$1.75 trillion in military expenditures has not caused the Soviet Union to wilt but rather has encouraged a steady increase in its military power."²⁵

If we realize our expansion has encouraged theirs (and possibly vice versa), we need to ask if there is an alternative strategy we might follow which would provide incentives for the Soviet Union to follow a different kind of US lead - a lead to reduce armaments and to demilitarize our relationship.

8.

Of course we want disarmament, but what about the Russians?

A.

It is difficult to assess Soviet intentions with any certainty. After all they have kept pace with the US and do maintain a formidable nuclear arsenal. Why should they give it up?

As the SALT II Treaty says, the US and the USSR have reached "parity". It is a unique and historic moment in the arms race. The Soviets, previously "behind", wouldn't reduce their arms from such a position of inferiority. The US wouldn't voluntarily give up its "lead". But now, for the first time in 35 years, both sides have agreed to their "equality". The Soviets are now in a political and psychological position to reduce. It is an opportune moment for a mutual freeze, after which, real reductions of equal value could be made. The Soviets do have good reasons as well as self-interest to engage in nuclear disarmament steps with the US.

From their point of view, since almost all the nuclear weapons in the world not in the Soviet Union are aimed at the Soviet Union, it would be to their advantage to reduce that

disproportion by engaging in mutual reductions with the US, their most significant adversary.

Second, the arms race is a terrible economic drain on the resources of the USSR. Many consumer items we take for granted, such as clothing, appliances, food and automobiles, are simply not available in adequate quantity to Soviet citizenry largely because of the diversion of national resources into arms spending. Any reductions would be desirable, beneficial and welcomed.

Finally, a mutually agreed arms freeze and/or reduction now would stop the superpower move to counterforce weapons - a technologic development that will be made first by the United States. Recognizing the military dangers of such a move, and being behind by several years in this development, the Soviets would see an advantage in stopping this mutual escalation of the arms race.

9. *The Soviet system is different. Even if the people want peace, the government isn't responsive to the Soviet people.*

A. Yes, the Soviet system is different. Imperfect as our system may be, we do have a representative government. The government of the USSR has a centralized authority vested in a small number of men. However, while the USSR is not democratic in our terms, we should also realize that there are opposing points of view within the Soviet government. The policies we follow do affect Soviet policy. By continuing to build up our military, we provide more fuel for those in the Soviet Union who would - and do - use US military power to justify a Soviet buildup.


Many Americans have little appreciation for the historic experiences of the Soviet people as it has to do with war. Three times during this century, the USSR was invaded by Western forces: during the First World War by the Germans, then right after their revolution in 1920 when 14 Western nations including the United States invaded, in an attempt to crush the new revolution, and finally in World War II when the German Nazis penetrated deep into the USSR - destroying 73,000 villages and cities and killing 20 million Soviet citizens.²⁶ No Russian was left unaffected.

These experiences have left deep psychological scars on the Soviet people and its government, creating an almost paranoid fear about war and military threats from the outside. Such a psychological heritage has also been exploited by the Soviet government leaders to justify more arms and to manipulate public opinion when it comes to intervening militarily in nations along the Russian border.

This being the case, what the US does that seems to threaten or inflame Soviet paranoia and insecurity, is likely only to increase a Soviet military response. What we need to do is strengthen those within the Soviet government who also recognize that reversing the arms race builds greater security.

The recent US-NATO plan to deploy 572 new nuclear missiles in Europe, particularly on German soil, caused tremendous anxiety in the Soviet Union. So great was the sentiment against these new "Euro-strategic" weapons, that President Brezhnev took the unprecedented step in October 1979 of announcing a unilateral reduction of Soviet troops (15% of all Soviet Warsaw Pact men) and arms in East Germany, as well as offering a unilateral reduction of the Soviets' most modern medium range nuclear missiles stationed in Russia.²⁷ His offer was dismissed by the US almost without consideration.

The Soviet Union has made other proposals to the West that were never seriously followed up, and so we will never know how serious the Soviets were in making them. These proposals included percentage cuts in military budgets, outlawing weapons of mass destruction, general and complete disarmament frameworks, reduction of armies in central Europe, comprehensive test bans, and pledges to never use nuclear weapons first, or against non-nuclear states.²⁸ Most of these initiatives remain virtually unknown to most American citizens. Those in the Soviet Union who favor more military buildup will remember them and their rejection by the US, and will likely increase the influence they attain in Moscow's ruling circles.



10. *But the Soviets have been expanding ever since World War II. Look what happened in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and now in Afghanistan. Aren't they also in Africa and hadn't we better be prepared to stop this Soviet expansionism?*

A. In recent times, the Soviets have exhibited a greater willingness to project power at a distance where the opportunity presents itself. As in the nuclear arms race, the USSR has been an imitator in acting like a superpower in global affairs—show the flag, naval power, proxy armies, military aid, etc. Compared to the United States's network of 200 bases, alliances, aid programs and covert operations, the Soviet efforts outside its "sphere of influence" are modest. In the spirit of agreements about spheres of influence reached at the end of World War II at Yalta, the Soviet Union annexed a number of countries and still attempts to govern them according to the interests of Moscow. This expansion of territory and power into Eastern Europe by the Soviets was a direct result of their experience with two German invasions that brought incredible death and destruction to the Russians. While the continued maintenance and oppression of these World War II satellite countries as a "buffer zone" is to be condemned, their original annexation occurred in its historical context.

The Soviets have not annexed any new territory since World War II. (It should be noted that the US also did its share of land grabbing after World War II. We held on to Guam and Okinawa, as well Micronesia and the Marshall Islands.) In



Oliphant in The Washington Star

'...and Ivan the Terrible grew bigger and uglier and nastier, but the poor Pentagon had no money to stop him'

Europe the United States directly intervened to shape the post war governments in Greece, Italy and of course, West Germany, though we did not annex any European territory.

Generally, the Russians have been very cautious about their foreign policy moves, but will indeed strike hard when they feel their "buffer zone" or control over that "buffer" is about to give way, as in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. The Soviets do take a special interest in their borders, and are committed, within the constraints of world politics and their own resources, to military and economic support of revolutionary regimes abroad. They will do so where they can, as in Ethiopia and Angola. And where they can't, as in Chile when Allende needed help, they won't. This is not to say that their motives have been pure and consistent. They have also supported fascist governments as in Argentina, Iran (where they sent 25,000 advisors for the Shah) and in Morocco, when it suited their economic or geopolitical interests.

As more and more Third World nations throw off their yoke of colonialism and neo-colonialism, and look around the world for help, the Soviets stand ready and willing. They have given massive military and economic aid and they have been successful in gaining influence primarily among the world's poorest and most desperate countries. But outside the Soviet Union's own border states, the Soviets have not sent troops, or intervened militarily in a direct fashion.

The USSR intervened directly on three occasions between 1948 and 1980 - in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, all border countries. In the same time period, the US directly intervened militarily (sending US troops) on the average of once every 18 months, to such places as Guatemala (1954), Lebanon (1956), Vietnam (1960), Dominican Republic (1965), the Congo (1960), Iran (1953), Laos (1960) and Cambodia (1970).²⁹ All of these interventions, which were carried out to help put down disruptive revolutions, were justified by the US government as efforts to "stop communism". But of the 60 nationalist revolutions that swept the globe after World War II, only two (Vietnam and China) were actually communist-led directly. None were led by the Soviets. The Soviets aided both Vietnam and China, only after long struggles by the rebellious populations themselves.

The simple fact is, the US is the only nation capable of projecting and sustaining its power by military force globally, according to a report made in 1979 by the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁰ At the moment and well into the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union cannot militarily "expand" through the Third World, because it lacks the necessary military capabilities such as a large Marine Corps,

Air Force transport force, Naval carrier force, air and ground support systems, amphibious assault and lift ships, etc. For these reasons, the Rand Corporation concluded that "gross Soviet capabilities to project power abroad do not remotely equal the US's" and could not sustain an occupation/invasion beyond its own immediate border state areas.³¹

The US is the only nation that has hundreds of thousands of its troops (540,000) stationed on over 200 bases and military installations around the world.³² It uses military aid, training and advisors extensively (currently relating to at least 61 countries, including 9 in Africa).³³ The Soviet Union is mimicking such activity in Angola and Ethiopia. While viewed as serious threats to our economic interests, they should be seen in the light of our own actions.

In fact, the Soviets have experienced major failures even in their relatively limited Third World presence. The Soviets have been kicked out of Egypt (1972), the Sudan and Somalia (1977) and several times out of Guinea Bisseau. To lesser degrees, they have overstayed their welcome in India, Iraq and Indonesia.

On a good day, according to the Center for Defense Information headed by Admiral Gene LaRocque, Russia can command the allegiance of only 19 countries (out of 155).³⁴ The Center's careful study, "Soviet Geopolitical Momentum" produced in January, 1980, found that Soviet influence, in fact, has actually decreased since the late 1950's, and their setbacks dwarf marginal Soviet advances in lesser countries. The US, on the other hand, commands 70% of the world's military and economic power.³⁵

In most countries of the Third World there is a growing resentment and resistance to domination by either superpower, whether it be military domination or economic. It is naive and patronizing of us to believe that Third World nations who throw off one form of oppression - neo-colonialism - are going to accept another kind from the Soviets. Iran is a good example. Iranians don't want to be dominated by either superpower. Whatever success policies the USSR or the US achieve in the Third World countries depends mostly on whether the policies serve the purposes of the local governments. In short, indigenous forces set the limits on what the Soviet Union can do in their nation.

11. *What about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Doesn't this prove the USSR is seeking to expand its territory?*

A. The Soviet view that Afghanistan is in its influence sphere is long standing, and there is nothing new or good about Soviet willingness to employ military power in adjacent territory if



they perceive their security threatened. The invasion of Afghanistan will surely go down as a brutal, immoral, tragic adventure. Typical of big power behavior, the Soviets moved into Afghanistan militarily when they were about to lose the political influence they had for many years. Prompted by the failing of the pro-Soviet government in power since 1937 and perhaps fearing the rise of Islamic revolution in the region, as well as Islamic and Chinese aid to Afghan rebels, the USSR invaded to restore its controlling influence. Without implying that the invasion was justified or that it can succeed, the invasion proved no direct threat to the United States.


Since 1977, Afghanistan has had an overtly Marxist government. The current rebellion is led by landlords and tribal chieftans who resisted the Marxist attempts at land reform and efforts to halt ancient religious and cultural customs. In Afghanistan, the literacy rate is 5%; the per capita income per year is \$120; infant mortality is running 253 per 1000. The revolution begun in 1977 to change these facts happened without the support of the Afghan people and was, therefore, doomed to failure.³⁶

The rebels who opposed the unpopular, pro-Soviet government began receiving massive aid from Egypt, Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia and China in 1978.³⁷ Later, the CIA admitted that it too, had sent guns and supplies.³⁸ Late in 1979, the Soviets watched the fervent Muslem nationalism sweep up the Persian Gulf, into Afghanistan. The Soviets have 50 million Muslims in Central Russia, just above the Afghan border, who could have been influenced to challenge Soviet central authority, further destabilizing the situation.

Add to these internal developments a considerable US military activity, including the formation of a NATO-like structure, in the Persian Gulf region that occurred in response to the hostage taking in Iran. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred precisely at the moment the US had its largest military presence in the Persian Gulf - two aircraft carrier Task Forces with 25 destroyers, 150 fighter bombers, 590 helicopters and 40,000 combat troops. From a Soviet perspective, it may have occurred to them that the US might have been tempted to seize a destabilized Afghanistan and

turn it into a new listening post on Russia's southern border. Would the US have reacted differently if the Soviets had massed a similar military force in the Gulf of Mexico?

The Soviet Union had its own reasons for invading Afghanistan. At the same time, United States actions toward the USSR in 1979 gave little cause for Soviet restraint. US talk of a military alliance with China, failure to ratify the SALT II Treaty, the large military budget increases, plans to install new nuclear weapons in Europe and the general failure of detente weakened whatever inhibitions the Soviets might have had to stay out of Afghanistan.



12. *Isn't the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a first step toward their eventual goal of gaining control of Middle East oil?*

A.

A look at the map reveals that the Soviets wouldn't need to go through Afghanistan to get to the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmen and the Soviet controlled Caspian Sea provide much closer and more direct access to Middle East oil fields than the treacherous passes of Afghanistan.

The Soviets are interested in access to raw materials, and according to the CIA, will be net importers of oil by the year 2000. But at the moment, the Soviets are the largest producers of the oil in the world—11.7 million barrels every day—from their own wells, with no evidence of the oil diminishing yet.³⁹ They are net exporters of oil with 71 billion barrels in reserve, 11% of the world total.⁴⁰ They also have one-third of the world's gas reserves and 57% of the world's coal.⁴¹ If the US is concerned about the Soviet need for oil, then the last thing we should do is cut off our supply of oil drilling bits to the Soviets which we did last winter. That technology will help them remain self sufficient in oil.

Even if one were to ignore these facts and assume that the Soviets do contemplate invading the Middle East for oil, the idea that either the USSR or the United States could take con-

trol and "protect" the flow of oil by military force has been shown to be practically impossible. The flow of Middle East oil can only be protected if there is peace and stability. At every stage—from extraction to storage, to shipment, to distillation—oil is the most vulnerable of resources. The fragile oil technology—including wells, rigs, pipelines and tankers—cannot be permanently protected or acquired intact by any outside military force, no matter how well trained and equipped.

13. *Doesn't the US have a responsibility to defend freedom and support our allies around the world?*

A. Certainly "defending freedom" and "standing by our friends" are principles that most Americans support. Moreover, most Americans recognize that the US is deeply involved in world affairs: politically, economically, socially and culturally. Like it or not, the US cannot become "isolationist" again. The debate begins over what "freedom" and what "friends" our government defends. Frequently, our "national interests" turn out to be the economic interest of the few.

The US has military pacts with 42 countries and treaties, executive agreements, arms sales, military associations and alliances with 92 countries.⁴² The US has given massive quantities (\$176 billion since 1945) in foreign military and economic aid,⁴³ and sold \$13 billion worth of arms to 90 foreign countries in FY '79.⁴⁴ This represents 56% of the world's arms trade - more than Russia, France, Britain and China combined.

Many Americans believe that the US has engaged in such military and economic commitments for the main purpose of preserving freedom and democracy. But the reality is that the top ten recipients of US military and economic aid, according to Amnesty International, are also the world's top ten dictatorships or violators of human rights: South Korea, The Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Haiti, Brazil and formerly, Iran.⁴⁵ Is there any way to justify US support to these governments as "defending freedom"? According to testimony by Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA), 51 countries or 69% of the nations receiving military grants from the US are classified as "repressive regimes". These governments allow US air and naval bases on their soil and offer a "favorable investment climate" for the US multinational corporations: low wages, no unions, no strikes, cheap raw materials and no government regulations. All these countries have conditions "favorable" to US business.⁴⁶

Eugene Black, former president of the World Bank and later President Johnson's advisor on Asian development, summed up the advantages of foreign aid to US business, thus:

The three major benefits are: (1) foreign aid provides a substantial and immediate market for US goods and services; (2) foreign aid stimulates the development of new overseas markets for US companies; (3) foreign aid orients national economies towards a free enterprise system in which US firms can prosper.⁴⁷

The Annual Report presented by our Secretary of Defense every year says that protection of \$168 billion worth of US private corporate investments, along with the "free access to" and the "continued flow" of raw materials, is one major assumption behind and purpose for our military forces.⁴⁸

Since mid-century, the US has not been self-sufficient in its raw materials needs. As a matter of fact, a former Secretary of the Navy said that "69 of 72 vital raw materials without which our businesses could not function, are wholly or in part imported into the US."⁴⁹ The US, as 6% of the world's population, actually uses 40% of the world's supply of basic commodities and raw materials, mainly acquired from the Third World.⁵⁰

It is for this reason that the bulk of the US military budget (80%) goes into "power projection" forces to distant places, while only 20% goes for the actual defense of the US continent.⁵¹

Since 1945, according to the Brookings Institute, the US has used military force 215 times to gain political or economic ends.⁵² In the name of national security, or the protection of areas of "vital interests", the US has also threatened the use of nuclear weapons 19 times.⁵⁵ (Truman and Eisenhower during the Korean War; Kennedy during the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis; Nixon during the Vietnam War; and most recently, Carter's explicit nuclear threat in his commitment to defend the Persian Gulf oil fields.)

The question for Americans is first, should we continue to "need" all the resources we gather, use and maintain in the Third World by our military might, and second, whether our military forces, or unused nuclear threats, or economic payoffs can "win friends" and protect our interests in the long run?

Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union and the US have both jockeyed for more favorable positions in the Third World. But neither superpower has been able to use its military to control indigenous movements totally, in for example, Iran (US) or Iraq and Egypt (USSR).

The Soviet presence in the Third World may have less to do with economics, but rather with superpower rivalry. The Soviet Union produces most of its energy sources and minerals it needs from the huge land mass under its direct control. They have few - if any - investments around the globe.

As many experts have pointed out, the Soviet military establishment is designed for different purposes than that of the US, with far more of its budget directed toward internal security and defense and virtually no "power projection" forces.⁵⁴

The crisis in Iran and Afghanistan demonstrated the ineffectiveness of military force to resolve what are basically political problems. Military strength could not free the American hostages nor could it prevent the Soviet Union from invading Afghanistan. Both conflicts confirm the increasing need to develop adequate diplomatic and political means of resolving the kinds of problems we are likely to face in the 1980's - as raw materials dwindle and as massive military arsenals make the idea of "being #1" more and more meaningless.


Many people would agree that we need a new foreign policy that recognizes the legitimate rights of indigenous populations and the need for just compensation for extracted raw materials. To ensure friendly, cooperative relations with the Third World, the US should be in favor of, and help build, a strong, non-aligned independent movement, free of super-power intervention. Such a movement will provide the strongest barrier to Soviet moves in the Third World.

14. *Everyone wants nuclear disarmament, but how would disarmament begin? What about the Soviet Union?*

A.

Of course, stopping the nuclear arms race must involve the Soviet Union as well as the United States, and the other countries which possess nuclear weapons. Although Costa Rica actually did abolish its military to save resources for social development, most nations are not going to disarm unilaterally. In the long run our goal must be general and complete disarmament. But how to begin?

One proposal receiving more and more attention is for a nuclear moratorium or "freeze". Since experts agree that currently there is parity or essential equivalence and both sides possess overkill capacity, now is the time for both nations to agree to a mutual 3 to 5 year freeze or moratorium on the pro-



curement, testing, production and deployment of all new nuclear warheads, missiles and bombers. Such a freeze or moratorium would begin when the President of the United States and the leaders of the Soviet Union announced simultaneously, or in close succession, a halt to new nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

The United States or the Soviet Union could start progress toward this agreement by taking minimal, independent initiatives before mutual agreement on the moratorium is reached. Initiatives might include a cessation of underground nuclear tests for three months; a ban on some or all missile firings; the announcement that military spending in the next fiscal year would not exceed that of the current year (with evidence of compliance submitted to the UN Center for Disarmament); the halt of further deployment, for a specific period, of one new strategic weapon, or improvement of an existing weapon. Each of these independent actions would need to be highly publicized and would be accompanied by an invitation for reciprocation. Failure to respond to an initiative would entail a loss of prestige or international influence in the international community, especially among non-nuclear nations.

This procedure follows precisely the precedent of the 1963 atmospheric test ban. In 1963 President John Kennedy took an independent initiative by proclaiming that the US would cease atmospheric nuclear testing so long as the Soviet Union did not test. A few days later the Soviet Union reciprocated, beginning a process of peaceful response and counter response which led to the negotiation of a successful treaty banning above ground nuclear tests.

15. *Even if the Soviets agree to arms limitation or reduction, how do we know they won't cheat? You can't trust the Russians!*

A.

We can never be 100% sure that one side or the other will not somehow find a way to subvert the very sophisticated mechanisms used to verify agreements on arms limitations. Called "national technical means" these mechanisms include photo-reconnaissance satellites and various other types of monitoring devices which do not require US physical presence on Soviet soil in order to check whether the Soviet Union is abiding by the agreement in question.⁵⁵ The Soviet Union uses similar mechanisms to make sure the US is not cheating. Another reason to support a freeze on new nuclear weapons is that according to experts on both sides, the current nuclear weapons are verifiable by available monitoring devices. New weapons may not be verifiable and will cause new problems for arms control.

If cheating did take place in any phase of arms limitations, (by either side), on a scale large enough to alter the strategic

balance, it would be discovered in time to make appropriate response. The real risk is in continuing the arms race.

When it comes to arms control treaties and agreements, history tells a clear story about Soviet violations. In the past 21 years, the US and the USSR have signed 14 constructive and lasting agreements which have not been violated by the Soviets.⁵⁶ The Dept. of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Dept. and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in response to allegations that the Soviets have broken agreements, stated in the summer of 1980 in their joint position paper that "Soviet compliance performance under 14 arms control agreements has been good."⁵⁷

These agreements include:

- the 1959 Antarctic Treaty internationalizing and demilitarizing that continent
- 1963 nuclear test ban
- 1967 ban on nuclear weapons in outer space
- 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty
- 1971 ban on placing nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor
- 1972 convention forbidding changing the environment for military purposes
- 1972 SALT II Treaty

The SALT I Treaty was signed in 1972 and, even though it expired in 1977, it has not been violated by the USSR to date.^{*58} Even the unratified SALT II Treaty the Soviets signed with the US in June '79 has been upheld. Under the terms of that agreement, the Soviets were to dismantle a number of their Delta-class submarines by May '80 and they have done so.

No nation will keep a treaty unless it is in its interest to do so.** It has been in the Soviet interest to keep its arms treaties.

* When the US did suspect some type of Soviet violation, the question was brought before a US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission created by the agreement; each time, the question was answered to the stated satisfaction of the US, according to the State Department.

** Over the years, the US has not kept some of its treaty agreements. We signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 renouncing war, but committed aggression within its definition of aggression more than a dozen times during the next decade. We invaded Nicaragua, but excused our action as defensible under the Monroe Doctrine. We joined the Organization of American States in agreeing not to interfere in the domestic affairs of American states, and then sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965. We signed the Potsdam Agreement to break up German corporations and make German rearmament impossible and proceeded to violate it right up to today with the placement of US nuclear missiles on German soil. We committed the Japanese to a constitution guaranteeing a non-military status, and are now pressuring for a change.

16. *But how about the Helsinki Treaty? The Soviets violate human rights, so why should we trust them?*

A.

The Helsinki Accord was not an arms control treaty. In fact, it was not even a treaty, legally binding all parties. Nevertheless, the Soviets didn't find it in their interest to honor the human rights aspects of the Helsinki document (which actually consolidated the post World War II boundaries in Europe.) The human rights provisions of the accords affected their domestic internal policies, which should not be confused with international arms control treaties.

It is still in their perceived self "interest" as a government to repress internal political expression and freedom of movement. These are political rights, and highly valued in the United States. The Soviets emphasize economic and social rights. Many Americans are not satisfied with the definition limiting rights only to political and civil ones, and we are gradually seeing the need to support economic rights as well. At the same time, here in the US, we have a responsibility to do what we can to support those within the Soviet Union who struggle for their political and and civil rights. But it is important how we do it.



For example, when, out of concern for the oppression of Jews in the USSR, Senator Henry Jackson attached the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Bill in 1974 requiring a certain quota of Jewish emigration from Russia in exchange for conferring "most favored nation" trade status on the USSR, the anger of the Soviet government at what it considered interference in its domestic affairs, made the number of Jews allowed to emigrate fall to an all-time low—10,000 in 1975. When relations were good—at the height of detente in late '78-79—emigration was the highest ever—51,000.⁵⁹

Internal oppression seems to increase when external events threaten the Kremlin's sense of security. When the US tightened the economic screws on Moscow over Afghanistan late in 1979, the Kremlin cracked down on Sakarov and other "dissidents." Threatening the Kremlin economically or with enormous destructive nuclear capabilities will not force them into a more acceptable human rights policy. The opposite seems to be the case.

17. *Even if the USSR and the US agree on initial steps toward disarmament, what about the other nuclear powers - China, for example, or the countries which already have or may soon have nuclear capability (Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, for example)?*

A. There are six known nuclear powers today. Unless there is a world wide effort to reverse the arms race, it is estimated that by 1985 there will be more than 35 nations with nuclear weapons capability, and perhaps 100 nuclear nations by the year 2000. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was signed in 1968 and was revised in 1980, prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states. It also prohibits the sale of nuclear materials which can be used for making weapons to those countries not signing the agreement. But not all potential nuclear powers have signed the NPT. Until those nations with huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons (principally the US and the USSR) begin to reduce those stockpiles as required by Article VI of the treaty, and until there are better guarantees that nuclear weapons won't be used against non-nuclear states, the treaty will lack appeal. If the superpowers continue to act as though they feel more secure with nuclear weapons than without them then there is very little incentive for other nations not to follow suit.

The decision by President Carter to sell 40 tons of enriched uranium to India—which has not yet signed the NPT or agreed to nuclear safeguards, and which has demonstrated a nuclear capability—diminishes the effectiveness of other non-proliferation efforts.

Developing nations actually have a great deal to gain from

disarmament. Many of these nations initiated the 1978 U.N. Special Session on Disarmament. Part of their reason for helping convene this world gathering on disarmament was their own unmet needs: since 1960, donor nations have spent a yearly average of \$5.00 per capita to aid poorer nations, and \$95.00 per capita for their own military forces. In developing nations there is one soldier for each 250 inhabitants and one doctor for every 3,700. Developing nations use five times as much foreign exchange for the import of arms as for agricultural machinery. And for the estimated cost of a new ICBM (the MX), 50 million malnourished children in developing countries could be adequately fed, 65,000 health care centers and 34,000 primary schools built.⁶⁰

There is certainly heated controversy over "who should go first" in the disarmament process - the military haves or the military have-lesses? What gets ignored in the controversy is the need for both superpowers to stop thinking that either side can "call the shots" any longer. We will find it much easier, both morally and politically, to address the militarization of other societies if we simultaneously address the militarization of our own nations.

18. *Unemployment is a terrible problem. Doesn't military spending provide jobs?*

A.

First, military spending actually provides us with many fewer jobs annually than would be created if the same amount of funds were spent in the civilian sector. A US Department of Labor study found that each \$1 billion spent on such national needs as environmental control, alternative energy development or mass transport would yield, on the average, 20,000 more jobs per \$1 billion spent, than if spent on military programs.⁶¹

Second, as William Winpsinger, President of the International Association of Machinists, one of the largest defense worker unions in the country, has said, "The Pentagon is a perpetual inflation machine. It drives up prices by pumping dollars, but not goods and services, into the economy, by siphoning scarce resources and raw materials into non-productive purposes, by condoning waste, cost over-runs and inefficiency among prime contractors who maximize profits by inflating costs, and by fueling ever larger deficits in the federal budget. More than half the present national debt is directly traceable to the Pentagon."⁶²

Third, since more than half of all Federal Research and Development funds are devoted to the military,⁶³ our military technology is now becoming the only area in which the US can still "compete" in the world economy. Unfortunately in the process, our civilian technological progress has become cor-



"Bring it past the Senate windows; they're discussing the military budget."

respondingly retarded, since about 50% of all the engineers and scientists in this country are employed by the defense establishment.⁶⁴

There is an alternative to this wasteful and dangerous military dependency. It's called economic conversion. The Machinists Union and the Auto Workers Union, who together make up more than half of all defense workers in the nation, have called for such a change and advocate legislation on economic conversion.

Senator Mathias has introduced the Defense Economic Adjustment Act in the Senate (and Cong. Weiss has introduced a House version). The bill would establish alternative use planning committees at major factories, create a contractor-financed trust fund to provide income payments to laid off workers and finance retraining.

The process of economic conversion (which could be funded in part by the significant savings which would follow real reductions in military spending) could help rebuild some of our past strengths: a civilian oriented economy with more available jobs creating more life supporting goods and services.

19. *Isn't military spending good for the economy? World War II got us out of the Depression, didn't it?*

A. World II may have generated economic momentum that helped us out of the Depression, but ever since, the high rate of military spending has placed a heavy burden on the economy.

Ever since World War II, the DOD has been the largest single user of capital and technology and this, in turn, has

placed serious restrictions on resources available for civilian use.⁶⁵ As a result, the productivity growth rate dropped to 2.1% by 1965 and to 1.8% by 1975 - the lowest ever for the US and the lowest of any industrialized country.⁶⁶ This has meant that production costs could no longer be offset to the same degree, and, in industry after industry, the consequent cost increase was passed along to the consumer in the form of higher prices. As this "pass along" accelerated, prices began rising at an inflationary rate.⁶⁷

The belief that military spending is good for the economy is no longer valid. We can not have both guns and butter. Substantial evidence indicates that the heavy burden placed on the economy by decades of consistently high military spending has helped create inflation, drained scarce resources, increased taxes, impeded civilian technological improvements, lowered the standard of living and generally undermined the economy.

Military spending is not the only reason for our current crisis of economic problems and the simultaneous existence of inflation and unemployment, but it does play a major role in our current difficulties.

20. *Everything you say sounds very risky. How can we rely on such an untested system when our security is at stake?*

A. The present untested system of security is based on raising the risks of disaster. It is because our security is at stake that a non-military security system makes so much sense. Our present insecurity - military, economic and political - is due in large part to our failure to develop a workable and practical method to resolve conflicts.

Pentagon planners tend to think that our current system - one based on military force and threat - is tested and proven. Yet our experience with the unpredictability of conventional war and the danger of nuclear accidents is anything but reassuring. A large nuclear bomb test in the Pacific unexpectedly contaminated 8000 square miles of ocean. We continually take enormous risks with our military system.

For many people, the issue gets down to the balancing of risks. They hope that by building more weapons the situation will somehow stabilize, that we will learn to live with the balance of terror. We can hope that the 35 or more countries likely to possess nuclear weapons soon, unless something is done to reverse this trend, will not miscalculate one day, and in an international crisis situation, deliberately begin a nuclear exchange. Or we can begin now to examine and support steps to reverse the arms race and develop alternative international security systems.

"It is no fairer to expect the advocates of an alternative security system to be able to predict exactly the future of human affairs than to expect the advocates of the military security to prove humanity will be secure with nuclear proliferation, the wasting of scarce resources, and continued military rivalry. To be sure, both paths are risky and fraught with danger. Yet, the risks for global community and genuine security are not unattractive when compared to the risks of perpetuating a system based on the threat of mass destruction."⁶⁸

21. *People have always fought. Isn't it unrealistic to expect us to get rid of war? Can we really change human nature?*

A. The views expressed in this pamphlet are hopeful views based on facts and on an unwillingness to settle for business as usual. We do not accept the formula that because something is now it must always be. It is useful to remember that people were convinced that slavery could never be abolished because it was a "natural part of life" and that "you couldn't change people". The Abolitionists were called "crazy" and "idealistic" and "naive".

To say that people have always fought is one thing. To say that because there has always been war there will always be war is another. People who support an alternative security system are not naive. They have decided that to continue on the old path of believing that nuclear weapons will not be used or that to prepare for war is the way to prepare for peace is the naive view.

It may be hard to imagine disarmament - a world without war - but is it not equally difficult to imagine a world after a nuclear war has occurred? Choices made today will surely effect which world greets our children tomorrow.

22. *Aren't we powerless - helpless - to do anything to change the situation? It's really in other hands.*

A. We are powerless and helpless only if we believe we are. In failing to act to change something, because the odds seem overwhelming, we create our own powerlessness. Yet to expect instant results - proof of our effectiveness - is to expect immediate gratification for actions which must be taken not just once but many times.

Remember, every great stride made in human progress was made through long, hard struggle which always seemed overwhelming to those doing the struggling. In our own history - the labor movement, the struggle for women's suffrage, the freedom struggle, the movement to end the war in Vietnam - all these took years of concerted effort against great odds.

The issue comes back to whether we see ourselves as "predictors" or "creators". If we sit back and predict doomsday; if we decide that nuclear war is inevitable; if we say that the time is so short that the situation is basically hopeless; then we will know at least one thing for sure: we are powerless and helpless. But if we focus on what can be created and changed, if we perhaps gain inspiration from similar efforts undertaken by people who also had no recognition for their efforts for many years (the Abolition movement against slavery, for example), then we begin to challenge the feeling of powerlessness and we begin to empower ourselves.

The situation will remain in other hands unless those who recognize the bankruptcy of our current direction begin to register their concern. One specific way to do this is to focus on the independent initiatives process. This could be done within the context of a nuclear moratorium. Increasingly, religious, civic and national organizations are advocating a nuclear moratorium which would include a ban or halt on all new weapons production, testing, developing and research. Such a move would need to be an independent action by the US, one which does not require Soviet approval as a precondition. However, it would be vital for the US to invite Soviet response, and, if such responses were not forthcoming, to explore other non-military methods which might provide incentives for reciprocation. Such independent assertions in a new direction can begin to break down the image that a nation cannot aggressively wage peace.



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